Contents

1. UNSCR 1284
2. UNMOVIC
3. The UN Humanitarian Panel
4. 'Suspension and Foreign Investment

On the 17th December 1999 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1284. This was the product of a year-long tussle between the Permanent Five members of the Council (Britain, the US, France, Russia and China) in attempting to agree upon a future policy regarding sanctions and weapons inspections. The Resolution was passed 11-0 with Russia, France, China and Malaysia abstaining. As had been anticipated, Iraq immediately rejected the resolution.

The next day The Guardian reported that the US and British Governments had gone "on the offensive last night to convince sceptics of the effectiveness and the humanity of the latest Anglo-American formula" (emphasis added). This stress on the "humanity" of 1284 reflects a growing public awareness about the impact that sanctions have had on ordinary Iraqis - and a concomitant need to pull the wool more tightly over the public's eyes.

1) UNSCR 1284 Return to top

1284 does three things : (1) it sets up a new inspection body (UNMOVIC) to replace the now-discredited UNSCOM; (2) it incorporates some of the recommendations of the UN Humanitarian Panel (March '99), though in such a way that most require further action by either the Council or the Sanctions Committee; and (3) it holds out the prospect of a "suspension" of sanctions and possible foreign investment in Iraq's oil sector if and when the Iraqi Government is found to have "co-operated in all respects" with UNMOVIC over a prolonged period of time.

2) UNMOVIC Return to top

1284 sets up a new weapons inspection body : the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). 1284 allows 75 days for the Secretary-General to appoint UNMOVIC's Chairman and for the Chairman to submit an organisational plan to the Council for approval. Within 60 days "after they have both started work in Iraq", UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency are to draw up "work programme[s] for the discharge of their mandates" - again for the Council's approval. Sanctions (ie. the import and export embargoes) can be "suspended" - and some form of foreign investment in Iraq's oil sector permitted - only after the Council has received reports from UNMOVIC and the IAEA "that Iraq has co-operated in all respects" with the two bodies for a period of 120 days. Even in the best of circumstances then, it seems that it could be 255 days before sanctions were suspended. In reality it is likely to be much longer, if ever. "All could depend ... on the interpretation of" the "deliberately vague text" with "Britain and the US expected to insist on the most stringent of interpretations" of the phrase : "co-operated in all respects" (Independent, 18th December).

3) THE UN HUMANITARIAN PANEL Return to top

In January '99 the Council, unable to agree a new policy on Iraq, commissioned three panels to study and make recommendations regarding disarmament, Kuwaiti claims and the humanitarian situation. The Humanitarian Panel reported (30 March '99) that "the humanitarian situation is indisputable and cannot be overstated" (emphasis added).

Ducking the issue of lifting the economic sanctions (this was "up to the Security Council to decide"), they made a number of modest recommendations which they believed "may lead to incremental improvements" (emphasis added). Their key recommendations to the Security Council were : (a) lifting the cap on oil sales under the oil-for-food programme; (b) "reducing by an agreed percentage the revenue allocated to the [UN] Compensation Fund"; (c) the creation of a 'cash component' for the south/centre; (d) the creation of a list of 'pre-approved humanitarian supplies' which could then be procured without needing to obtain the approval of the Sanctions Committee (a so-called 'green list'); and (e) authorising private investment flows into the Iraqi oil industry and other non-military export industries (dates, sulphur etc.)

(a) Lifting The Cap

1284 has removed the cap on oil sales under the oil-for-food programme (previously set at $5.2bn per six-month phase). Note that there was never any humanitarian rationale for there to be a cap: the oil-for-food bank account is controlled by the Council, which approves every purchase and monitors distribution inside Iraq.

(b) Compensation Fund

Crucially, 30% of all revenues raised under the oil-for-food programme will continue to be paid into the Compensation Fund (for war reparations). At current oil prices and export levels this is a substantial amount (approx. $5bn/year). A previous draft resolution had proposed reducing the percentage paid to the Fund to 20% for a period of six months. Even this feeble proposal did not survive into 1284. The former head of oil-for-food in Iraq, Denis Halliday, stated that all payments to the Fund should be postponed "as long as one Iraqi child is dying ... from the impact of sanctions." voices agrees.

(c) Cash Component

The 3 autonomous governorates in northern Iraq have received 10% of oil-for-food revenues in currency, while the Government- controlled centre/south has received only commodities. The Panel had noted that the absence of such a 'cash component' in the centre/south was "seriously impeding the distribution of some humanitarian supplies". 1284 requests the Secretary-General "to make the necessary arrangements, subject to Security Council approval " (emphasis added) for the setting up of such a component.

(d) 'Green List'

1284 directs the Secretary-General to draw up a 'green list' of humanitarian items "including foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, as well as basic or standard medical and agricultural equipment and ...educational items". We are concerned that the list will not include crucial infrastructural items - such as items in the electricity and water/sanitation sectors - many of which are currently being blocked in the Sanctions Committee. The UN Development Programme has estimated (Nov. '99) that if all the holds in the electricity sector were removed, Iraq could potentially increase its electrical supply by 50%.

(e) Oil Spare Parts

1284 asks the Secretary-General for a report "on the progress made in meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, and on the revenues necessary to meet those needs". This is to include recommendations as to whether the current allocation for oil spare parts - $300m per phase - needs to be increased. The Council expresses its "readiness" to authorise such an increase on the basis of this report.

The Secretary General has repeatedly called for the doubling of this $300m allocation, most recently in a letter to the Council's president (14th Jan. 2000) where he notes that, "the continuing deterioration of the oil facilities may...cause a major breakdown in Iraq's oil production and export capacity", with "serious repercussions" for oil-for-food.

3) 'SUSPENSION' AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT Return to top

As noted above, 1284 states the Council's intention to "suspend ... for a period of 120 days" the import and export sanctions relating to civilian commodities (with the exception of 'dual-use' goods) after a lengthy period of co-operation "in all respects" by the Iraqi Government with UNMOVIC. These sanctions can be swiftly re-imposed in the event of reports of Iraqi non-cooperation. Ironically the resolution notes that "improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq" is one of the "fundamental objectives" of suspending sanctions - something which 1284 will delay, possibly indefinitely.

1284 also expresses the Council's intention to "take steps" - based on a report commissioned by the Secretary-General - to enable Iraq to increase its oil production/exports. This could include some form of foreign investment. 1284 does not mention the Panel's recommendation (see (e) above) that private flows into non-military export industries other than the oil sector be permitted.

Fundamental Failure

Human Rights Watch has stated (5th January 2000) that the Panel's recommendations "should not be treated as bargaining chips to be implemented only on condition of Iraqi Government cooperation" and that they should be implemented "promptly and without condition "(emphasis added). At the same time they note that the recommendations on their own do not go far enough since oil-for-food "does not contain the elements of comprehensive planning and economic revival that we believe are essential in order to reverse the dangerously degraded state of the country's civilian infrastructure and social services."