1) INTRODUCTION Return to top

Mr Simon Wren of the Ministry of Defence has sought to defend the policy of the British Government regarding sanctions on Iraq by drawing attention to alleged obstruction and prevarication by the government of Iraq. He makes a number of allegations, which are, with a few exceptions, a tissue of fabrication and lies.

2) INADEQUACY OF TRANSPORT Return to top

Mr Wren writes that : ‘Apologist[s] for the regime have stated that this situation is primarily due to a lack of transport and that sanctions are making this worse... [But] there are [sic] no shortage of vehicles for the military or Saddam Hussein’s priority items such as electrical equipment where 98% have been delivered.

Second, it is patently untrue to say that Iraq is unable to acquire the necessary vehicles. Hundreds of vehicles have been delivered since the humanitarian ‘oil for goods’ [sic] programme began in December 1996. The UN have agreed to contracts for over $130M of capital and spares expenditure for vehicles - $55M trucks/lorries, $59M tractors and $12M for forklifts... It is the responsibility of the Iraqi Government to ensure that, once agreed, the suppliers actually deliver upon these contracts.’

Critics of the British government’s policy on sanctions (who Mr Wren chooses misleadingly to describe as ‘apologists’ for the Iraqi regime) have merely cited the reports of the UN Secretary-General, and his explanation for the extraordinary amounts of medicines and medical supplies currently in warehouses in Iraq. Without independent information, we have been unable to ‘state’ anything ourselves.

Would Mr Wren care to explain (a) how he knows that there are no shortages of vehicles for the Iraqi military, (b) what proportion of these vehicles would be suitable for loading/unloading and transporting the medical supplies in question, (c) exactly how many vehicles have actually been delivered to Iraq under oil-for-food and in which categories, (d) when the contracts for the trucks/lorries/tractors/forklifts were agreed by the Sanctions Committee, and (e) how many of these vehicles have been assigned to the loading/unloading and transportation of medical supplies, as opposed to food and agriculture, for example? Only when he gives detailed answers to these questions can we evaluate his charges against the Government of Iraq.

In the absence of detailed and truthful answers substantiating his argument, we can only rely on the Secretary-General’s assessment, which we will come to shortly, an assessment which directly refutes Mr Wren.

In his two-yearly review of oil-for-food, the Secretary-General has observed, ‘In the crucial area of distribution of inputs, vehicles and related logistics equipment, including computing equipment, have had to compete, usually with limited success, for scarce resources with other essential inputs. The exception has been in the food sector where transport and logistics are recognized as priority concerns.’ (28 April, emphasis added) In other words, it is clear that priority has been given, within the allocation for transportation and logistics equipment, to food rather than medicine, with the agreement of the UN and the Sanctions Committee. Mr Wren evades this issue, and by his evasion misrepresents the situation.

In his latest report, submitted to the Security Council the day before Mr Wren wrote his reply, the Secretary-General writes: ‘WHO has reported that the Kimadia warehouses currently operate at 20 to 35 per cent of their pre-sanction capacity. The warehouses have no proper handling equipment, and lack transport to move the supplies to end-user facilities.’ (Emphasis added.) This is not the whole story, by any means, but this unambiguous statement flatly contradicts and refutes Mr Wren’s claim that the Iraqi government has been provided with all the vehicles that it requires for the handling of the medicines currently stored in central warehouses.

3) DELIBERATE STOCKPILING Return to top

Mr Wren actually cites the Secretary-General’s explanation of the backlog of medical supplies, but distorts the meaning of the report, implying that ‘slow ordering by the state-owned drug company’ is deliberate obstruction, when in fact the Secretary-General stated in his February report ‘WHO reports that Kimadia [the state drug company] attempted to computerize the ordering process at the start of phase IV [of oil-for]food] and brought in new people, but their lack of experience with computers only further delayed the ordering process.’ This is the only reason for ‘slow ordering’ given in the Secretary-General’s report.

Mr Wren suggests that the ‘most worrying’ explanation for the backlog given by the Secretary-General in his February report is that there was ‘deliberate hoarding by officials in anticipation of emergency needs’. When we turn to the report itself, we find the following sentence: ‘A variety of sources, including WHO, suggest that stockpiling seems to have increased following September 1998, when tensions mounted, and superiors may have deliberately withheld supplies in anticipation of emergency needs.’ In other words, an increment may have been added to the backlog after the US and Britain began threatening Iraq with airstrikes last autumn. Two points arise:

A) This cannot explain the backlog that accumulated before September 1998. As at 31 July 1998, the backlog stood at nearly $215 million, according to the Secretary-General’s September 1998 report. We may take it therefore that the deliberate portion of the increase in stockpiling after September 1998 accounts for only a small fraction of the total of $275 million. (‘As at 31 July 1998, medicine valued at $313,440,420, had arrived in the centre and south of Iraq, of which $98,533,794, or 16 per cent of allocations under phases I to III, has been delivered to end-users.’)

B) Mr Wren suggests that this suspected deliberate stockpiling is evidence of malign intent. But is it irresponsible of a health authority, warned of an impending military assault, to centralize its resources in order to deploy them quickly to affected areas? If all the medicines concerned had been evenly distributed before the attack, and the bombardment had then created a large number of casualties in only a small number of areas, a proportion of the medicines would have had to have been collected from regional and local stockpiles and sent to the affected areas, a rather inefficient process.

4) THE COMPARISON WITH THE NORTH OF IRAQ Return to top

Mr Wren says that the problems with distribution of medicines in government-controlled Iraq are ‘in stark contrast to the North, where the regime is not involved in distribution and there are very few if any shortages of essential drugs and decreasing malnutrition.’

Malnutrition

The first point to make is that the level of chronic malnutrition among children in the North is virtually identical to that in South/Central Iraq. Acute and general malnutrition in the three autonomous northern governorates have declined considerably over the period of oil-for-food, and are well below rates in government-controlled Iraq - 13.6 per cent of children under five in the case of general malnutrition, compared to 22.8 per cent in South/Central (according to the Secretary-General’s 18 May 1999 report). However, chronic malnutrition (or ‘stunting’) of children under five in the North has remained stable for the last six months at ‘about 24 per cent’ (May 1999 report). The rate of chronic malnutrition in South/Central is reported to be ‘an estimated 25 per cent of the population of children under five years old’ (September 1998 report).

Greater Provision

Secondly, the two regions have enjoyed different levels of outside provision. The Secretary-General’s February 1999 report commented, ‘While the prevalence of malnutrition has declined in the three northern governorates, it remains high in the centre/south. The fact that the per capita value of inputs in the north significantly exceeds that in the centre/south provides one explanation for the increasing difference between them.’ The Northern governorates receive 19.7 per cent of revenues available for humanitarian relief (13 per cent of total oil revenues), while holding only 14.5 per cent of the total population (3.2m Northern ration card holders out of a total population of 22m).

Unfair Comparison

Thirdly, the Secretary-General has also observed, in his two-yearly review of oil-for-food, ‘In the three northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, malnutrition rates dropped significantly in response to the distribution of a food basket where none existed before.’ (28 April 1999, emphasis added) The fall in malnutrition rates is in large measure due therefore to the fact that there is a food ration at all, rather than the superior efficiency of the UN administration in the North.

The 'Cash Component'

Fourthly, the recent report to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Iraq by a special panel commented that, ‘The differential reduction [in malnutrition] in the North [compared to South/Central] is due in part to higher per capital locations of the 986 [oil-for-food] programme, especially in agriculture, water and sanitation and education. Several UN agencies as well as the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq pointed to the fact that the unavailability of a cash component for the South further exacerbates these disparities.’ (30 March 1999, emphasis added) The report also observed, ‘While there is agreement that the Government could do more to make the "oil for food" programme work in a better and more timely fashion, it was not clear to what extent the problems encountered could be attributed to deliberate action or inaction on the part of the Iraqi Government. It is generally recognized that certain sectors such as electricity work smoothly while drug supplies suffer from delays in distribution. But mismanagement, funding shortages (absence of the so called "cash component") and a general lack of motivation might also explain such delays.’

The ‘cash component’ of funding for logistical support in the Northern governorates has, according to the new UN Humanitarian Coordinator, a significant impact on the health of the population. Accordingly, the panel made the following recommendation: ‘Under the relevant Security Council resolutions the Government of Iraq may not have direct or indirect access to revenue raised under resolution 986 (1995). This limitation is seriously impeding the distribution of some humanitarian supplies, especially in the Center/South. Given this situation, which was raised by several presentations to the panel, the Security Council should consider the establishment of a "cash component" for the Center/South on the basis of plans submitted by Iraq and approved and monitored by the OIP. Respect for the legitimate national sovereignty and dignity concerns of Iraq should be ensured in the negotiation of any appropriate arrangement.’

Mr Wren gives no hint in his response that a panel of UN experts consider the lack of a ‘cash component’ to be such a significant contributory factor to the delays in distribution that they have recommended an alteration in the basic principles of oil-for-food. I should point out that Mr Wren wrote his letter to six weeks after the submission of the panel report to the Security Council.

In sum, one cannot attribute the faster falling rates of malnutrition in the North to the greater efficiency of the UN administration or the deliberate obstruction of the Iraqi government because a) while some kinds of malnutrition are lower in the North than in government-controlled Iraq, chronic malnutrition is at virtually exactly the same level in both regions, b) the oil-for-food ration was the first food ration for many years, and c) humanitarian provision under oil-for-food has, for various reasons, been greater in per capita terms in the northern governorates. Equally, it is impossible to make a simple comparison of the efficiency of distribution of medicines in the North and in South/Central because in the Kurdish areas the oil-for-food programme’s logistical support has included a vital ‘cash component’.

Mr Wren, like many British propagandists, seeks to imply that the differences between Northern Iraq and government-controlled Iraq are due to the deliberate obstructiveness of the Iraqi government. However, like his colleagues, he refuses to acknowledge the complexity of the situation where this is unhelpful to his case, and he fails to provide substantiation for his insinuations.

5) TARGETED NUTRITION Return to top

Mr Wren is out of date on the issue of the targeted nutrition programme. In the 18 May Secretary-General’s report, it was announced that ‘As at 31 March 1999, the [Iraqi] Ministry of Health had signed four contracts for therapeutic milk and three contracts for high protein biscuits. The first contract valued at $1,692,100 for the procurement of high protein biscuits was received by the Security Council Committee on 3 March 1999 and approved on 9 March, but the supply has not yet arrived in the country. In addition, the Ministry of Health has concluded contracts with suppliers covering the full 1,500 tons of therapeutic milk allocated during phase IV. However, no new applications for either phase IV or phase V have been received since 3 March 1999. This comes to slightly over 15 per cent of the total allocations for the two targeted nutrition commodities in phases IV and V.’

Mr Wren is correct to point out that the UN has expressed grave concern over the delay in the introduction of the targeted nutrition programme for infants, pregnant and lactating mothers. No explanation for the delay has been made public. However, it is important to note that ‘UNICEF has pointed out that chronic malnutrition, which affects an estimated 25 per cent of the population of children under five years old, is not directly reversible by supplementary feeding alone. It is a function of poor feeding practices by parents, limited access to basic preventive health care, shortage of safe drinking water, poor sanitation and illiteracy’. (Secretary-General’s report, September 1998)

This does not affect our judgement of the Iraqi government’s delays in relation to the targeted nutrition programme, but it should put the issue into context. It is not the case that the introduction of the nutritional programme will solve the problem of child malnutrition.

6) REDUCTIONS IN ALLOCATIONS Return to top

The oil-for-food deal is based on a Distribution Plan (DP) agreed between the government of Iraq and the UN. The DP sets out the allocation of money for each sector (food, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, agriculture, electricity, etc.). Within each sector, there are detailed plans for what to buy over the six months. However, over the last year there have been considerable problems due to the fall in oil prices, which has meant that the total amount of oil revenues has been considerably less than the ceiling of $5.2bn every six months. As the level of projected revenue has oscillated with the price of oil, the total amount available for humanitarian relief has also see-sawed, and the various Iraqi ministries, together with the UN, have had to re-calculate the allocations for each sector and within each sector.

Reduced Allocations

Mr Wren states, correctly, that ‘The regime has reduced revenue allocated to food, health & nutrition, water & sanitation.’ However, he does not explain that this is because of a dramatic fall in projected revenues for oil-for-food. In his September 1998 report, the Secretary-General stated that ‘an amount of approximately $1.79 billion would be available to finance the humanitarian supplies authorized in resolution 1153 (1998) and the oil spare parts and equipment authorized in resolution 1175 (1998). This amount falls far short of the funds required to implement fully the enhanced distribution plan, namely, $3.1 billion.’ In other words, there would be only 57.7 per cent of the funding which the Distribution Plan had been based on. In such circumstances, it would be surprising if the Iraqi government had not reduced revenue allocated to food, health and nutrition and water and sanitation. Mr Wren’s insinuation that the reduction has been carried out simply because the Iraqi government cares nothing for its people is a breath-taking piece of propaganda.

Reduced Daily Ration

Mr Wren writes, ‘Report shows that the daily ration is down to only 2002 calories - almost 20% below the level recommended by the UN.’ He appears to be referring to the February 1999 Secretary-General’s report. In fact, the recommendation to provide 2,463 kilocalories per person per day was made in February 1998, long before the collapse in oil prices. The Secretary-General’s report makes clear that the figure of 2,002 kilocalories was actually an increase of 2.5 per cent over the previous energy level of 1,955 kilocalories, not a reduction in the food ration as stated by Mr Wren. I reproduce the relevant paragraphs below:

24. The programme review undertaken in January 1998, and the supplementary report which followed (S/1998/90), recommended an increase in the caloric value of the food basket to 2,463 kilocalories per person per day. In phase IV, the Government distribution plan proposed a food basket which would provide 2,300 kilocalories per person per day, and in phase V, the Government distribution plan proposed a food basket which provided 2,200 kilocalories per person per day. The phase IV food basket was expected to go beyond the phase III food basket by adding full cream adult milk powder and weaning cereal, but these supplements did not arrive in sufficient quantities to permit distribution. It was only in January 1999, the final month of the reporting period, that stocks were sufficient to permit their distribution in the basket for the first time. The Government has increased the monthly handling fee paid by consumers to food agents from ID 105 to ID 150 to compensate for the costs of distributing these additional items.

25. From November 1998 to January 1999, the food basket provided an increase of daily kilocalories per person per day from 1,955 to 2,002. There was a modest increase in kilocalories per person per day over the time period, but none of the monthly food baskets met the targets of phases I, II or III. In all three months, insufficient stocks of pulses kept the baskets at sub-target levels. (February 1999)

Frivolous Requests : Telecommunications

Mr Wren follows the previous two comments by saying, ‘We understand that, at the same time, Iraq has asked for £25M to be allocated to banknote counting machines and £100M for telecommunications equipment and that both requests have been rejected by the UN.’ He implies that these are absurd requests. Information on the banknote counting machines is unavailable. On the issue of the telecommunications equipment, the Secretary-General wrote to the Security Council on 13 May (six days before Mr Wren wrote his letter) to inform the Council that he had approved ‘a revised part seven of the distribution plan, concerning telecommunications’. (S/1999/559) The original plan had been refused pending a joint technical review by UN and Iraqi experts. Having conducted such a review, the UN experts from the International Telecommunication Union concluded in their report (appended to the Secretary-General’s letter) that ‘the entire telecommunication infrastructure is deteriorating to such an extent that the quality of service is beyond comprehension.’

The transfer of computer files was impossible over the public telephone network, directly affecting UN observation activities and reporting. Unreliable international communications meant that Iraq continued to experience difficulties in establishing and maintaining external contacts with potential producers and suppliers of humanitarian items. The joint review recommended funding to address these issues, as requested by Iraq, and a number of other projects. Among them were the replacement of the analogue Baghdad Junction Network with a digital network, which would benefit directly ‘all those involved in the humanitarian program, including 34 hospitals and 98 drug distribution points... 6 ration centres, 124 ration branches, 9400 food agents and 5323 wheat flour agents...’ A similar replacement programme linking Baghdad, Basra and Um Qasr (where humanitarian commodities will be landed under oil-for-food): ‘Reliable and easy communications between Baghdad and the concerned governorates and Um Qasr is extremely important for efficient coordination and management in the process of the supply and distribution of food and medicine. Some of the direct beneficiaries of this project are those involved in the humanitarian program in the area covered by it including (76) hospitals, food distribution points which includes (7) ration centers, (148) ration branches, (9895) food agents and (5213) wheat flour agents.’

The review also recommended the introduction of a ‘small mobile telecommunications network’ in Baghdad which would bypass the saturation and network problems in Baghdad, and ‘solve the communication problem faced by every essential and important location related to humanitarian distribution services... in addition to more than (10) United Nations humanitarian agencies operating in Iraq’.

The recommendations in the review amounted to $126 million worth of projects ($18.7 million in the North). After he had considered the review, the Secretary-General granted permission for this allocation, having ‘concluded that the revised plan concerning telecommunications, if properly implemented, should enhance the implementation of the humanitarian programme throughout the country’. In other words, Baghdad’s request for over $100 million worth of telecommunications showed concern for the humanitarian programme rather than the reverse.

7) FOOD EXPORTS Return to top

Mr Wren writes ‘I am sure you will be interested to note that the previous report indicates that wheat and barley yields are up by 15% which should help the Iraqi people. However, the regime is selling wheat and barley to Syria at cut prices.’

Firstly, we should note that there is currently a massive failure of agriculture in Iraq. According to a 2 June 1999 report by Associated Press, the Food and Agriculture Organisation states that Iraq has lost 70 per cent of its crops in the country's breadbasket, and the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq, Hans von Sponeck, has declared the situation ‘a catastrophe’, noting that ‘low rainfall and higher temperatures have had a disastrous effect on crops and livestock’ and that 90 percent of wheat and barley fields in these areas ‘have failed to germinate’. Mr von Sponeck also ‘expressed fears about whether the [Iraqi] government will be able to sustain its food rationing system, upon which millions of Iraqis depend for sustenance.’

Returning to the issue Mr Wren raises, of exports of wheat and barley in an earlier period, he does not indicate his source of information for his claim. Nothing in any of the Secretary-General’s reports would support such an allegation. Assuming for the sake of argument that Mr Wren is correct in what he says, what should we make of this suggestion?

The Secretary-General’s two-year review of oil-for-food states that ‘the negative impact of the free distribution of flour [through oil-for-food] on the demand for locally produced wheat is acting as a disincentive to produce, and risks undermining the local agricultural economy.’ The review noted that in the North, ‘the distribution of wheat flour in the food ration has significantly undermined the demand for locally produced wheat - the region's main crop - and led to a sharp fall in wheat prices in the local market, despite the fact that the Government has procured 107,000 tons or 30 per cent of the 1998 production in the three governorates. For wheat farmers, this has led to a serious loss in profitability...’

The February report stated that although wheat yields in the 1998 season increased by 25 per cent over the previous year, and 30 per cent of the total production of 355,935 tons was sold to the Government as of 30 September 1998, ‘A large proportion of production, however, remains unsold, and even though production costs have been reduced by the provision of inputs from FAO, many farmers are experiencing income losses as market prices fall for food basket items. The market price for wheat dropped from $88 per ton in January 1998 to $56 per ton in November 1998.’

The import and free distribution of wheat flour has had a grave impact on local agriculture. Given this reality, and the reality of unsold local produce, is it surprising that some of the crop is sold abroad? Is it evidence of an uncaring government?

8) THE REFUSAL OF HUMANITARIAN AID Return to top

Mr Wren states that ‘since June of last year, Iraq has refused to accept donations of humanitarian aid other that [sic] from the UN.’

In fact, the oil-for-food programme is not a programme of ‘humanitarian aid from the UN’, as it is entirely funded by the sale of Iraq’s own oil resources. I visited Iraq in August 1998, shortly after the ‘ban’ was introduced, and was surprised to find almost all the humanitarian aid agencies working normally in government-controlled Iraq (including the Middle East Council of Churches, the Mennonite Central Committee, the Italian group ‘Bridge to Baghdad’, and others). I was informed that the main effect of the ban on humanitarian aid was to stop the high-profile ‘humanitarian flights’ to Iraq.

It is unclear, therefore, whether the government of Iraq really has refused all donations of humanitarian aid since June last year. Even if this was true, however, Mr Wren would surely agree that the scale of donations to Iraq are minuscule compared to the billions of dollars generated by Iraqi oil sales, which fund oil-for-food, which continues without Iraqi interference.

9) CONCLUSION Return to top

Mr Wren concludes from his survey of the Iraqi situation that ‘All of this leads back to one simple conclusion - that Saddam Hussein does not give the welfare of his people enough, if any, priority.’

Having tested Mr Wren’s assertions against the available evidence, we are lead back to the simple conclusion that he, and the government he represents, do not give the truth enough, if any, priority. In case after case, it has been shown that Mr Wren distorts and misrepresents the situation. He lies. What is worse, he lies in the service of a policy which is killing, according to the former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, over 4000 children every month. Denis Halliday, who resigned from his post as Humanitarian Coordinator for reasons of conscience, has stated, ‘We are in the process of destroying an entire society. It is as simple and terrifying as that. It is illegal and immoral.’ (Independent, 15 October 1998) Mr Wren seeks to obscure these realities with his half-baked distortions.

Yours sincerely