Contents

1. When Were Sanctions Imposed?
2. Resolution 687
3. Before...
4. 1993...And after
5. Oil For Food
6. Denis Halliday Resigns
7. 'A Potentially Emotive Issue
8. Massive Deterioration
9. The Obvious Response

1) WHEN WERE SANCTIONS IMPOSED? Return to top

The economic sanctions on Iraq were imposed by the United Nations on the 6th August 1990, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Their stated purpose was to "bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end ". In their original form sanctions prohibited all imports to Iraq except medical goods and all exports from Iraq (in particular oil).

In March 1991 a UN mission to Iraq reported a situation of "near-apocalyptic" destruction in the wake of the Gulf War with "most means of modern life support … destroyed or rendered tenuous". Despite these circumstances a decision was made to maintain sanctions. This was spelt out on the 3rd April 1991 in UN Security Council Resolution 687. SCR 687 also modified the terms of the import embargo to permit food and "supplies for essential civilian needs". However, this change was more cosmetic than real (see ‘… and after’ below).

2) RESOLUTION 687 Return to top

Resolution 687 created a new set of obligations that Iraq had to meet in order for sanctions to be lifted. These included destruction of its chemical, biological and long-range weapons and an acceptance of liability for all war-related losses and damages. By making the resolution of the public health crisis in Iraq dependent upon the co-operation of the Iraqi Government with 687’s demands the UN committed a gross violation of the human rights of ordinary men, women and children in Iraq.

As the Centre for Economic and Social Rights points out : "… the [Security] Council remains accountable to human rights principles regardless of the conduct of the Iraqi government … Saddam Hussein’s intransigence cannot justify violations by the Council. As a matter of fundamental principle, human rights are based on the inherent dignity and worth of every human person, and are owed directly to individuals. These rights are not forfeited because of a government’s misconduct … Iraq’s failure to comply with Security Council resolutions therefore does not give the Security Council license to disavow its independent obligations to respect the human rights of the Iraqi civilians"

3) BEFORE ... Return to top

Prior to the imposition of sanctions the Iraqi welfare state was "among the most comprehensive and generous in the Arab World" with Iraqis enjoying "one of the highest per capita food availabilities in the region"( Economist Intelligence Unit, Iraq : Country Report 1995 –96). There were more than 250 hospitals, with an extensive network of primary and health care facilities. By 1990, nearly all urban dwellers and 72 percent of rural residents had access to clean water, while 93 per cent of Iraqis had access to health services (UNICEF, State of the World’s Children,

4) 1993...AND AFTER Return to top

While food, medicines and "supplies for essential civilian needs" were technically exempt from sanctions after April 1991, sanctions deprived Iraq of the foreign currency it needed to pay for these vital goods. Heavily dependent on such imports (eg. prior to sanctions, 70 percent of Iraq’s food supply was imported) and with its civilian infrastructure devastated by the Coalition’s bombing campaign the massive public health crisis precipitated by the war was both exacerbated and perpetuated. Loss of electricity (the bombing targeted the generators) resulted in the collapse of the water and sanitation systems. The resulting lack of clean drinking water resulted in widespread illness. To this day, waterborne disease remains one of the biggest child-killers in Iraq.

In June 1991 UNICEF reported "an alarming and rising incidence of severe and moderate malnutrition" amongst Iraqi children. In August 1991, a Harvard-based international study team surveyed more than 9000 households in nearly 300 population centers throughout Iraq. According to their data, there were 47,000 excess deaths among children under five years of age during the first eight months of 1991.

In 1995 the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation reported that "about 70 percent of the population is in a precarious condition".

Surveys conducted by UNICEF in 1997 showed that "32 per cent of [Iraqi] children under the age of five, some 960,000 children" were "chronically malnourished". Subsequent surveys in 1999 showed that child mortality rates in south/central Iraq had more than doubled since 1989.

5) "OIL-FOR-FOOD" Return to top

Since January 1997 Iraq has been able to purchase a limited amount of humanitarian supplies through the so-called "oil for food" programme. Under this (UN) programme Iraq is permitted limited oil sales, the proceeds from which are paid into a UN bank account in New York. Of this money the UN allocates 34% to purposes other than the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, namely payments to the UN Compensation Fund and to pay for UN operations in Iraq.

The programme runs in six-monthly phases. The ceiling on oil sales for the first three phases was set at $2 bn per phase. This was subsequently raised to $5.2 bn per phase.

Due to low oil prices and the dilapidated state of Iraq’s sanctions-stricken oil infrastructure, Iraq was unable to meet the $5.2 bn ceiling until the current phase (Phase VI).

There has never been any humanitarian rationale for there to be any ceiling on oil sales under the programme since the bank account is controlled by the UN, all purchases have to be approved by the UN Sanctions Committee and the UN monitors the distribution of goods within the country.

6) DENIS HALLIDAY RESIGNS Return to top

On the 30th September 1998 the head of the "oil for food" in Iraq, Denis Halliday, resigned from his position in protest stating that "4000 to 5000 children are dying unnecessarily every month due to the impact of sanctions because of the breakdown of water and sanitation, inadequate diet and the bad internal health situation" (Independent, 15/10/99).

7) ‘A POTENTIALLY EMOTIVE ISSUE" Return to top

"Oil for food" has glaringly failed to resolve the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Iraq. After almost three years of implementation one in five Iraqi children are suffering from chronic malnutrition. This failure should come as no surprise since the programme "was neither designed to, or is sufficient, to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi people" (UNICEF, August ’99).

Indeed, the original motivation behind "oil for food" was political not humanitarian. As one US official rather candidly explained "oil for food" was "a good way to maintain the bulk of sanctions and not be on the wrong side of a potentially emotive issue". The fact that it didn’t have a hope of resolving the humanitarian crisis was clearly not considered important.

8) MASSIVE DETERIORATION Return to top

In December 1998 the World Food Programme reported that "the main reason" for the continuing nutritional crisis in Iraq was "the massive deterioration in basic infrastructure". The UN has estimated that it would take more than $7 bn to address the electricity sector’s operating problems. This alone exceeds all funds for humanitarian goods available through the programme over the course of a whole year. The UN has warned that a collapse of this sector could create "humanitarian circumstances [which] could potentially dwarf all other difficulties endured by the Iraqi people". Other sectors require billions of dollars of investment.

A UN panel commissioned to study the Humanitarian Situation in Iraq concluded in April of this year that : "Regardless of improvements that might be brought about in the implementation of the current humanitarian programme – in terms of approval procedures, better performance by the Iraqi government, or funding levels - the magnitude of the humanitarian needs is such that they cannot be met within the context of the parameters [of the "oil for food" programme]"

9) THE OBVIOUS RESPONSE Return to top