Contents

1. Poor Aim
2. When Were Sanctions Imposed
3. Food And Medicine
4. The $10 Billion Lie
5. Oil For Food?
6. Adequate Provision
7. Hoarding Medicines?
8. Palaces
9. Less Food?
10. North/South
11. "Iraqis Will Pay The Price"

In a recent (16/10/99) letter the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) claimed that "… the government of Iraq … churns out propaganda attempting to divert the blame for the suffering caused by its behaviour on to others. This is a crude and cynical campaign …"

Ironically this is a perfect description of what the British government is doing. Over the last fifteen months we have had to respond to a long list of lies and deception emanating from the FCO and prominent government spokespersons concerning the sanctions on Iraq. Too long, in fact, to list them all here. What follows is merely a selection of the British government’s lies and deceit on these issues.

1) POOR AIM ? Return to top

"Sanctions are not aimed at the Iraqi people" (letter from the FCO, 13 October 1998).

In November 1997 UNICEF’s representative in Baghdad, Philippe Heffinck, noted that "It is clear that children are bearing the brunt of the … economic hardship" caused by sanctions (emphasis added).

The most careful assessment of the impact of sanctions that we’re aware of is that by the co-chair of the human rights committee of the American Public Health Association, Richard Garfield. In his paper "Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 through 1998" (March 1999) he writes that by "1996, after five years of sanctions …mortality among children under five [had] reached a minimum of 80 per one thousand. A rate last experienced more than thirty years ago … This rise in the mortality rate accounted for between a minimum of 100,000 and more likely estimate of 227,000 excess deaths among young children from August 1990 through March 1998. About a quarter of these deaths were mainly associated with the Gulf war; most were primarily associated with sanctions." (emphasis added).

In an article published in 1997 Eric Hoskins, an adviser to UNICEF on economic sanctions, noted that "the impact of sanctions has fallen predominantly on a growing number of the poor in Iraq" while "the Iraqi regime has continued to appear well entrenched and in firm control".

If sanctions aren’t aimed at the Iraqi people the British government’s aim must be awfully poor.

2) WHEN WERE SANCTIONS IMPOSED ? Return to top

"...from the very start of sanctions in 1991 Iraq has been allowed to import food and medicines" (letter from the FCO, 10 September 1999).

Sanctions were imposed on 6th August 1990 in order to reverse Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Eight months later, in April 1991, Iraq had left Kuwait and a UN mission to Iraq reported a state of "near-apocalyptic" destruction where "most means of modern life support [had been] destroyed or rendered tenuous". A decision was made at that point to keep sanctions in place until the Iraqi Government had complied with a fresh set of demands. For the first eight months of sanctions food was prohibited. Even before the war malnutrition rates were on the rise (with early signs of famine in evidence during the war itself).

3) FOOD AND MEDICINE. Return to top

"Food and medicines have never been covered by sanctions" (Robin Cook, ‘We’re ready to bomb not bluff’, Daily Telegraph, 18 November 1998).

After April 1991 food, medicines and "supplies for essential civilian needs" were technically exempt from sanctions. However this had little practical effect since sanctions prevented Iraq from obtaining the foreign currency it needed to pay for these vital goods. Through numerous statements like Mr Cook’s the British Government has tried to fool people into thinking that the supply of food and medicines to Iraq has not been seriously affected by the sanctions regime – it has, and dramatically so.

4) THE $10 BILLION DOLLAR LIE Return to top

"Baghdad can now sell over $10 billion of oil per annum to pay for food, medicine and other humanitarian goods" (Robin Cook, statement to Parliament, 3 November 1998).

Since December 1996 Iraq has been selling oil through the oil-for-food programme. The proceeds from these sales are paid into a UN-managed bank account based in New York. The program runs in 6-monthly phases. For the first six phases the UN imposed an artificial cap on the value of oil sales permitted under the programme : $2bn per phase for phases I - III, increased to $5.2 bn per phase for phases IV - VI. UN Resolution 1284 (17th Dec. '99) finally removed the cap. Note that there was never any humanitarian rationale for the existence of a cap since the Security Council controls the bank account, approves every purchase contract and monitors the distribution of supplies inside Iraq.

The UN allocates the revenues raised through the programme as follows : 30% for war reparations, 4% for UN costs (including weapons inspectors), leaving only 66% for the purchase of humanitarian supplies. Mr Cook was well aware of these facts when he made his statement. (In fact available revenues were even smaller due to low oil prices and the dilapidated state of Iraq's oil industry).

5) OIL FOR FOOD ? Return to top

"...Iraq [was] first offered the opportunity to export oil to fund the purchase of humanitarian goods as early as 1991. By refusing to implement a UN Humanitarian programme for over five years, Iraq allowed the humanitarian situation in Iraq to deteriorate" (FCO letter, 10th September 1999).

Strictly speaking this cannot be called a lie : it depends upon one's assessment of where the blame lies. Who "allowed the humanitarian situation in Iraq to deteriorate" : Iraq, by rejecting the UN programme or the UN, by maintaining economic sanctions ?

The first oil-for-food resolution (UN Security Council Resolution 706) was adopted on the 15th August 1991. By then an estimated 47,000 excess deaths among children under five years of age had already taken place. (This estimate is based on the data collected by a Harvard-based international study team during August' '91.)

A July '91 UN report had estimated that it would cost $22 billion to restore power, oil, water, sanitation, food, agriculture and health sectors to pre-war levels. The same report produced an estimate of $6.8 bn, over a one year period, for the cost of bringing about a situation of "greatly reduced social services" : 50 % of pre-war electrical capacity, 40 % of water and sanitation services and enough food for subsistence rations for the whole population.

706 and its successor 712 (19th September '91) capped oil sales at $3.2 bn a year - from which 30% was to be deducted for payment to the Compensation Fund. Prior to the passage of 712 the UN Secretary General tried unsuccessfully to have the six-monthly ceiling raised to $2.4 bn. In November '91 The Independent 's diplomatic editor, Sarah Helms, reported that "President Saddam might have accepted the resolution" if a higher sum had been agreed.

According to an aid agency staff member involved in the discussions in Baghdad, even by late July '91 "UN officials were convinced ... that the US intention was to present Saddam Hussein with so unattractive a package that Iraq would reject it and thus take on the blame, at least in western eyes, for continued civilian suffering" - which is exactly what happened (Middle East Report, Jan/Feb '92). As one US official rather candidly explained, oil-for-food was "a good way to maintain the bulk of sanctions and not be on the wrong side of a potentially emotive issue" (Independent, 24 July '91).

UN SCR 986 (14th April '95) raised the ceiling to $2 bn every six months. It was accepted by the Iraqi Government in May '96.

6) ADEQUATE PROVISION ? Return to top

"despite revenue under "oil-for-food" being less than we had hoped, it still ought to be sufficient to meet the immediate needs of the Iraqi people" (letter from FCO, 19 February 1999).

In April '99 the UN Panel commissioned to study the humanitarian situation in Iraq found that, "Regardless of the improvements that might be brought about - in terms of approval procedures, better performance by the Iraqi Government, or funding levels - the magnitude of the humanitarian needs is such that they cannot be met within the context of" the oil-for-food programme. "Given the present state of the infrastructure, the revenue required for its rehabilitation is far above the level available under the programme."

Crucially, the UN has long recognised that ‘genuine nutritional security cannot depend on food alone, but, inter alia, is affected by the prevalence and extent of coexisting disease, the deterioration in water and sanitation infrastructure, dilapidated health facilities and reduced agricultural production’ - all of which need funding under oil-for-food (Secretary-General’s report, 1 Feb. ’98). Kofi Annan had also warned in Feb. ’98 that the electricity sector was deteriorating, and that the collapse of the sector could create ‘humanitarian consequences [which] could potentially dwarf all other difficulties endured by the Iraqi people.’ In Feb. '98 the UN estimated the total value of all projects necessary to address the electricity sector's operating problems to be over $7 billion

The UN Humanitarian Panel commissioned in January '99 to study the humanitarian situation in Iraq concluded that "the humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi economy which in turn cannot be achieved solely through remedial humanitarian efforts."

As Human Rights Watch have observed (4th January 2000), oil-for-food "does not contain the elements of comprehensive planning and economic revival that we believe are essential in order to reverse the dangerously degraded state of the country's civilian infrastructure and social services." Oil-for-food cannot solve the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

7) HOARDING MEDICINES ? Return to top

"Saddam … now hoards vast quantities of medical supplies rather than distributing them to his people" (Defence Secretary George Robertson, letter to The Times, 6 March 1999).

The Government cited the UN Secretary General’s February ’99 report on the implementation of the "oil for food" programme as evidence for its claim. What the report actually said was that "as of 31 January '99, approximately $275 million worth of medicines and medical supplies had accumulated in warehouses" in Iraq. The report noted that this constituted "more than half of all supplies" so far imported under oil-for-food. However, nowhere in his detailed explanation of this problem did the Secretary-General suggest that there had been any deliberate obstruction by the Iraqi government. Instead he referred to "the lack of modern managerial tools, poor working conditions within the warehouses and the lack of transport for moving the supplies to health centres", the "rigid hierarchy in the Ministry of Health", and possible "stockpiling ... in anticipation of emergency needs" following September '98 "when tensions [with the US/UK] mounted".

A "comprehensive analysis of stocks" at the Kimadia warehouse in Baghdad initiated by the World Health Organisation - and starting in May '99 - found that as at the 31 July '99, of the 31.2 % of medicines left undistributed, most (namely 26.7 % of all medicines that had arrived in the country) "represented buffer and working stock". 65 % of medical supplies and equipment had been distributed and "fifteen percent of the remaining stock represented items undergoing quality testing, having failed quality testing or awaiting the arrival of complementary accessories".

The remaining undistributed medicines and medical supplies (less than $86 mn in value) can no doubt be explained, in large part, by the fact that, "a humanitarian programme of such magnitude requires a commensurate level of transport, communications and material-handling equipment" (S-G Report Feb. '99) and that "few of these essential pre-requisites have been made available in a timely manner" (oil-for-food's Executive Director in a statement to the Council, emphasis added).

8) PALACES. Return to top

"Saddam Hussein has always preferred to spend Iraq’s money on himself. Since the Gulf War, he has built numerous luxurious Presidential places … It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Saddam Hussein has deliberately taken a cynical decision to allow Iraqi people to starve …" (letter from FCO, 7 May 1998)

The issue of the palaces may well be a red herring. It is foreign exchange that Iraq needs in order to import food and medical supplies and to buy essential machinery and spare parts needed to provide clean drinking water, a functioning agricultural sector etc. No credible evidence has ever been provided that the building of presidential palaces has absorbed non-trivial amounts of foreign exchange, thereby diverting foreign exchange which could have been spent on buying food and medicines. Indeed, pressed on this point by a member of the public, the FCO simply resorted to bluster : "the exact figures are not important. We know that they are many and that they have cost millions of dollars." (FCO letter, 16th October '98).

9) LESS FOOD ? Return to top

"the Iraqi distribution plan allocates less to food than it did when the programme was worth only $2 billion (it is now worth $5.2 billion)." (FCO letters, February/March 1999).

Turning to the UN Secretary General’s two-year review of oil-for-food (28th April '99) we find the following : "In the enhanced distribution plan for phase IV, the Government of Iraq increased the targeted amount to 2,300 kilocalories per person per day. Owing to the substantial fall in revenues, however, the funding level for food as approved in the enhanced distribution plan was reduced by the Government from $1.113 billion to the level of the previous phases, just over $902.8 million." (emphasis added).

10) NORTH/SOUTH. Return to top

"...we do not accept that sanctions are responsible for the increase in mortality rates or the decline in the humanitarian situation in Iraq more generally. This view is corroborated by the [August 1999] UNICEF report [on child and maternal mortality in Iraq]. The statistics in that report show that in the areas of Iraq where Saddam Hussein is in control, mortality rates have risen significantly since 1991. However, in the northern governorates which are subject to exactly the same sanctions regime but which have been under UN control since 1991, mortality rates have decreased over the same period. These figures confirm that it is the government of Iraq by deliberately hampering the humanitarian effort in the areas under control which is the primary cause of the suffering of the Iraqi people" (FCO letter, 10 September 1999).

The UNICEF document referred to is "Child and Maternal Mortality Survey 1999, Preliminary Report". The surveys showed that in the center/south of Iraq – where 85% of the population lives – the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) has more than doubled from 56 deaths (1984 -1989) to 131 deaths (1994 - 1999) per 1000 live births. In the Northern governorates the U5MR rose from 80 deaths (1984 –1989) to 90 deaths (1989 – 1994), and then fell to 72 deaths (1994 –1999) per 1000 live births. Thus child mortality rates are higher in south/central Iraq.

However, UNICEF were emphatic in rejecting the allegation that these differences in child mortality were due to Baghdad’s alleged ‘hampering’ of the programme. In their ‘Questions and Answers for the Child Mortality Survey’ UNICEF said : "What we do know is that the difference [in mortality rates between the north and south/center] cannot be attributed to the differing ways the Oil for Food Program is implemented in the two parts of Iraq".

Also, in flat contradiction to the notion that the surveys "corroborated" the view that "sanctions are not responsible for the increase in child mortality rates in Iraq or the decline in the humanitarian situation in Iraq more generally", UNICEF stated that sanctions were "certainly one factor" in the rise in child mortality. UNICEF also cited, with approval, the UN Humanitarian Panel's judgement that "the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of war".

So what does explain the differences in mortality rates ? UNICEF stressed the need to look at "longer-term trends and factors including the fact that since 1991 the north has received far more support per capita from the international community than the south and centre of Iraq". They also noted that "another factor may be that the sanctions themselves have not been able to be so rigorously enforced in the north as the border is more "porous" than in the [south/center]".

Incidentally there have been some significant differences in the implementation of the programme in the north and in the south/center : eg. the north "receives 22% more per capita [than the south/center], and gets about 10% of all UN-controlled assistance in currency [a so-called 'cash component'], while the rest of the country receives only commodities ... Goods have [also] been approved by the UN and distributed to the North far faster than in the Center or South" (Richard Garfield (see page 1) in an unpublished letter to the New York Times, August '99). One of the provisions of UNSCR 1284 (December '99) is the setting up of a cash-component for the center/south.

11) "IRAQIS WILL PAY THE PRICE" Return to top

"Full Iraqi cooperation with the weapons inspectors could have produced the lifting of sanctions long ago. Pressure would therefore be better directed at the Iraqi regime, rather than at governments which insist on nothing more than that Iraq fulfil its international obligations." (FCO letter, Feb/March '99)