The Foreign Office (FO), under increasing pressure from people concerned about the humanitarian crisis created by the UN sanctions on Iraq, has been doing its best to 'spin' the issue - that is, to make it appear that the FO is greatly concerned about the people of Iraq, and is doing its best to relieve the situation. This briefing comments on some of the assertions currently being made by the FO. The comments are intended to supplement our briefing 'a crude and cynical campaign' . All quotes in bold are taken from a single letter from the Foreign Office dated 23 March 2000.

It is important first of all to be clear why there is such a crisis in Iraq - this is not something one could glean from letters sent out by the FO, who tend to pick on certain potentially emotive issues ('hoarding medicines', for example), distort the truth, and conclude that, 'It's all Saddam's fault'. In fact, the fundamental problems are :

(1) the massive deterioration of Iraq's war- and sanctions- stricken civilian infrastructure, which sanctions have prevented Iraq from reconstructing and;
(2) the fact that sanctions have devastated Iraq's economy (which was almost totally dependent on oil sales) with the result that people often don't have the purchasing power to buy what they need.

It should be borne in mind that a deliberate decision was made during the 1991 Gulf War to attack, and in some cases destroy, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (most notably the electricity system). In March '91 a UN mission to Iraq reported a situation of 'near-apocalyptic' destruction in the wake of the Gulf War with 'most of the means of modern life support...destroyed or rendered tenuous.'

It was in these circumstances that the Security Council decided to keep economic sanctions in place. The consequences of this deeply wicked act - namely, tens of thousands of dead and dying children - were well understood at the time and have remained so.

FOREIGN OFFICE ASSERTIONS

1. '[UN Security Council Resolution 1284] reflected our longstanding and deep-seated commitment to...the well-being of Iraq's people...offering the Iraqi people, unconditionally, a bigger and better humanitarian programme, it also provided for the suspension of sanctions... if Iraq co-operates with UN arms control monitors.'
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Resolution 1284 (December '99) incorporated a number of the recommendations contained in a March '99 report by the UN Humanitarian Panel. However, several crucial recommendations (eg reducing the percentage paid into the Compensation Fund and authorising private investment in Iraq's non-military export industries) were omitted entirely and of those which were incorporated, most required further action by either the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee, or were made conditional upon a protracted period of 'co-operat[ion] in all respects' with the new weapons inspection body, UNMOVIC.

Even if Iraq had accepted the resolution this latter period of co-operation would only have begun to be measured after UNMOVIC had had a Chairman appointed and organisational plans and work programmes drawn up - a process that, in itself, would have taken (and indeed is taking) many months.

Human Rights Watch has stated (Jan '99) that the Panel's recommendations, 'should not be treated as bargaining chips to be implemented only on condition of Iraqi Government co-operation', but should be implemented 'promptly and without condition'.

Human Rights Watch also noted that simply implementing the Panel's recommendations was insufficient since oil-for-food, 'does not contain the elements of comprehensive planning and economic revival that we believe are essential in order to reverse the dangerously degraded state of [Iraq's] civilian infrastructure and social services' (emphasis added). In this judgement they concur with the UN Humanitarian Panel who concluded their report by noting that :

'the humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi economy.'

As the Economist Intelligence Unit notes (March '00), for normality to return to Iraq, 'sanctions will have to come to an end'.

2. 'Recently the UN recommended that Iraq set aside $91m for targeted nutrition for groups such as infants and new mothers; Iraq allocated only $24 m.'
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The $91m figure appears in the Secretary-General's (S-G's) February 1998 recommendations for the allocation of additional oil-for-food revenues after the oil-for-food programme was 'enhanced' from $2bn to $5.2bn per six-month phase. (These are gross figures: the UN allocated 34% of all revenues for war reparations and UN expenses).

The S-G's recommendations were based on the assumption that there would be $3.4bn per phase available for the purchase of humanitarian goods. Low oil prices meant that Iraq was unable to meet this target until the second half of 1999. Even now, with anticipated revenues in excess of $3.4bn, there still isn't enough money available to meet all needs - any money moved over to targeted nutrition would have to be taken from another vital sector, eg electricity or agriculture.

In November '99 the S-G noted that, 'further development of [the proposed targeted feeding] programme...[would] require a cash component' for the oil-for-food programme in the center/south - that is, money to pay for training and implementation. Despite a recommendation by the UN Humanitarian Panel to this effect the Council has yet to act.

Having said all this it is true that the Iraqi Government has been slow to implement targeted feeding programmes. Why? In an interview with US congressional staff members last September, UNICEF's director in Iraq, Dr Rao Singh, described the Iraqi government's definition of equity in access to food, medicine etc: 'Their goal is to provide everyone with exactly the same amount of the [however insufficient] goods' :

'In her own personal capacity Dr Singh critiqued that definition, saying that she believes it more appropriate to define equity as providing to each according to what they need - meaning that those who suffer need a special focus. She said Iraq was not the only country to use such a definition. Other officials indicated that they understood Iraq's fear of being accused of favouring any particular region, sector or community' (Congressional staffers' Iraq trip report, March 2000, available on ReliefWeb : www.reliefweb.int).

In his September '98 report the S-G noted that : '[C]hronic malnutrition...is not directly reversible by supplementary feeding alone. It is a function of poor feeding practices by parents, limited access to basic preventive health care, shortage of safe drinking water, poor sanitation and illiteracy.'

Levels of chronic malnutrition in the north and in the south/center remain very similar (despite the implementation of targeted nutrition programmes in the northern governorates) - namely 20.4 per cent in the south/center compared to 18.9 per cent in the northern governorates. Last August Benon Sevan, the Executive Director of oil-for-food, told the Council that:

'We should not be simplistic on this very serious issue. Targeted nutritional programmes on their own will not reverse the trends so starkly described in [UNICEF's] recent survey [on child and maternal mortality]. The [UN Sanctions Committee] has a crucial role to play in expediting the approval of applications which have a direct impact on the health and well being of children. What is required is an all out effort to approve most expeditiously applications submitted under water and sanitation, health and electricity sectors.' (emphasis added).

3. 'In 1998 the Secretary General recommended a daily food ration of 2463 kcal. The Iraqi Government [GOI] sets the current average daily food ration at just 1993 kcal. The latest report by the UN Secretary General...notes that Iraq is ordering insufficient quantities of pulses and dairy products to make up the food ration and not including sufficient protein.'
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The GOI has not 'set' the daily food ration at 1993 kcal - this was its average value. The current Iraqi distribution plan sets the target for the food basket at 2,330 kcal per person per day.

While the S-G's March '00 report did state that the failure to meet the targets for the food basket was 'largely as a result of shortfalls in pulses and dairy products due to under-contracting by the [Iraqi Government] and poor supplier performance' he went on to note that 'overall, the effects of the shortfall were minimized by the Government, which complemented the basket from its own stocks' (emphasis added). Benon Sevan has noted that :

'A major problem being faced by the Government...[is] supplies and equipment which on arrival are found to be defective or do not meet quality control standards...The situation has worsened as many suppliers with whom Iraq has longstanding commercial dealings have become reluctant to supply goods under the 986 programme, given the lengthy delays in contracting and approval. As a consequence, Iraq is obliged to procure through less reliable brokers.' (emphasis added)

As regards protein, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation estimates that 'holds' in the Sanctions Committee - and the resultant delays in the arrival of vaccines - have resulted in the loss of around seven million kg of meat.

4. 'The UK puts only a tiny percentage of "oil for food" contracts on hold (about 1% overall).'
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This may be true, although it is unclear whether the percentage referred to is a proportion by number or by value. The overwhelming majority of 'holds' are placed by the US, with Britain a distant second. However, even a small number of holds can cause huge problems. In October '99 Benon Sevan noted the serious problems that occur when one of a number of complementary or interrelated applications is placed on hold: 'The absence of a single item of equipment, sometimes insignificant in size or value, can be sufficient to prevent the completion of an entire project.'

According to The Economist, the US and Britain have 'abus[ed] their power' on the Sanctions Committee where they are 'deliberately gumming up the oil-for-food programme'.

5. 'There is no guarantee that if sanctions were lifted the Iraqi regime ... would give any greater priority to the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people than it does now.'
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In a 1997 report three economists from the London School of Economics noted that outside commentators have tended to 'equate political absolutism with absolute appropriation of public resources for private ends', assuming that 'the over-riding and exclusive financial priorities of the Iraqi leadership are to amass private wealth and to bolster the state's coercive apparatus'. In fact, they observed, '[W]hile there is no doubt that private appropriation and military expenditure are important priorities for the Iraqi leadership, commitment to social welfare is also an important government priority in its own right.'

They noted that this commitment to social welfare was 'not new found' and had to be 'viewed in the historical context of welfarist interventions by successive governments in Iraq':

'These interventions, which include action by the government on a variety of social and welfare issues, such as education (particularly the education of girls), public health care, development of infrastructure and indeed radical land reforms, have been consistent and substantial features of public policy at least since the late 1950s.'

According to epidemiologist Richard Garfield there was an 'accelerated decline' in infant and child mortality rates during the 1980's despite 'a major diversion of economic resources to war', whilst 'access to doctors and hospitals improved, the population continued to become more urban, clean water became more accessible, food prices remained stable and immunisation coverage improved.'

The International Committee of the Red Cross states that, 'Just a decade ago, Iraq boasted one of the most modern infrastructures and highest standards of living in the Middle East', with a 'modern, complex health care system' and 'sophisticated water-treatment and pumping facilities' (Iraq : A Decade of Sanctions, ICRC, December 1999).

Looking forward, we must realise the importance of Baghdad's longstanding commitment to public health and education, the role played by such investments in securing the Ba'ath Party's appeal to its supporters, and the huge pent-up demand for these public services caused by (and blamed on) the economic sanctions. The Foreign Office deftly avoids some awkward realities when it points out (correctly) that there can be 'no guarantees' of increased Iraqi government spending on social welfare programmes after the lifting of sanctions. There is only one guarantee: as long as the economic sanctions continue, thousands of children will continue to die every month, in large part because of the cruelty and indifference of the British Foreign Office.
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